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The nature of forgetting in short-term memory remains a disputed topic, with much
debate focussed upon whether decay plays a fundamental role (Berman et al., 2009;
Altmann and Schunn, 2012; Barrouillet et al., 2012; Neath and Brown, 2012; Oberauer
and Lewandowsky, 2013; Ricker et al., 2014) but much less focus on other plausible
mechanisms. One such mechanism of long-standing in auditory memory is overwriting
(e.g., Crowder and Morton, 1969) in which some aspects of a representation are
“overwritten” and rendered inaccessible by the subsequent presentation of a further
item. Here, we review the evidence for different forms of overwriting (at the feature and
item levels) and examine the plausibility of this mechanism both as a form of auditory
memory and when viewed in the context of a larger hearing, speech and language
understanding system.
Keywords: auditory cognition, short-term memory, memory, forgetting, auditory scene analysis
Like many cognitive capabilities, language is grounded in memory. A failure to appreciate what
has just gone drastically limits the ability to comprehend the present and any capacity to anticipate
the future. Both long-term memory (for semantics and other lexical and world knowledge) and
short-term memory (a record of the immediate past) are implicated in this process. In the current
paper, a particular focus is placed upon the relationship between memory and language reception
(e.g., hearing) rather than production (e.g., speaking). Although the latter is clearly of importance –
both as an aspect of language in which memory must play its part and as a means by which (via
overt or sub-vocal rehearsal) information is maintained in short- or longer-term memory (Craik
and Watkins, 1973; Ward et al., 2003; Ward and Tan, 2004; Taylor et al., 2015) – a focus on the
nature of the auditory-perceptual input suggests constraints on how any system accepting such
input must be configured.
A key feature of the classical short-term memory (STM) research program is the importance of
serial order (Lashley, 1951; Conrad, 1960; Murdock, 1968, 1983; Lewandowsky and Murdock, 1989;
Henson, 1998; Brown et al., 2000; Botvinick and Plaut, 2006; Burgess and Hitch, 2006). Words,
letters, or digits are presented sequentially and participants required to recall the items in the order
in which they were presented. Short-term memory tasks are usually deliberately designed so that
the associations to be held across multiple items (words, digits, letters) are arbitrary. Performance
in such tasks is framed in terms of its proximity to verbatim recall of all the items, namely the
correct item in its position at presentation. Implicitly, short-term memory theorists make the
assumption that the “item” (the word, letter, or digit of interest)—rather than the relationship
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between items—is the most meaningful unit of analysis.
Moreover, identification of the item at recall is the basis for
correct scoring in the memory test. Despite known problems with
identifying the “item” in anything other than a logically circular
way (Miller, 1956) such an approach is defensible in cases where
the items are well-known and taken from a small, circumscribed
set (e.g., digits) and where recollection of an item at a time
collapses into a requirement to select the most likely candidate
given the degraded or incomplete information available (Nairne,
1990). This contrasts starkly with the situation in most everyday
language, in which structured, non-arbitrary relationships are
available between individual elements represented at multiple
levels (phonotactic, syntactic, semantic, pragmatic) and the
identification of a single “item” is neither necessary nor sufficient
to comprehend the meaning of the sequence.
By considering veridical recall of arbitrary items rather than
the relationships between them, much of interest is lost with
regards to later analyses. A key component of perception is
in organizing as well as registering information and of interest
is whether, in registering and organizing the stimuli prior
to retrieval, the perceptual system represents them in a way
that harmonizes with the retrieval requirements in standard
short-term memory tasks. Given the emphasis on the iterative
retrieval of items across the to-be-remembered sequence, does
the perceptual system, for instance, cluster items at a supra-item
level in such a way as to aid or to hamper efficient retrieval?
In other words, does perception result in ‘items’ corresponding
exactly to items specified in terms of the linguistic taxonomy
(such as single syllables, words, or digits) on which the sequence
is nominally based? In the event of supra-item organization, how
are items grouped or transformed? Is there grouping of adjacent
elements (as with chunking, classically) or are non-adjacent items
organized into a greater whole? Within item-focussed approaches
to short-term memory—ones that assume recall is a product of
an aggregation of elemental actions—forgetting may be explained
by the ‘overwriting’ of items by subsequent events. If supra-
segmental organization occurs, is overwriting still a plausible
mechanism?
Here, we explore how the registration of events in memory
reflects auditory input and, in particular, the organizational
processes that are at play. On the basis of key phenomena in
auditory perception we consider potential implications for the
structure of short-term memory and, in particular, the nature of
forgetting.
THE “STANDARD” MODEL OF MEMORY
The modal model of memory, informed by neuropsychological
case data, has always assumed a functional and structural
distinction between short-term and long-term memory, with the
former fed by largely unspecified perceptual input processes,
frequently depicted as a buffer storage system (Shallice and
Cooper, 2010). In long-term memory, where the notion of
memory as a reliable, veridical system has long since been
dismissed and a reconstructive account of recall is generally
accepted (Bartlett, 1932), suppression, inhibition and blocking of
the memory trace have all been discussed as possible explanations
of forgetting (for example in the context of the misinformation
effect in eyewitness memory). In contrast, discussions of short-
term and sensory memory have been less open to the idea
of memory distortion as normal and recall as a reconstructive
activity. In consequence, processes that highlight deterioration of
the representation such as decay and overwriting (respectively)
have predominated as mechanisms for forgetting and active
supra-segmental organizational processes (such as grouping
into objects), which may equally hamper recall when they
are inconsistent with retrieval requirements, have been largely
ignored.
Much has already been written both critiquing the evidence
for decay (e.g., Neath and Nairne, 1995; Nairne, 2002;
Lewandowsky and Oberauer, 2008, 2009, 2015; Lewandowsky
et al., 2008; Oberauer and Lewandowsky, 2008, 2013; Brown and
Lewandowsky, 2010; Neath and Brown, 2012) and defending the
concept (Altmann and Gray, 2002; Portrat et al., 2008; Altmann,
2009; Barrouillet et al., 2011; Altmann and Schunn, 2012) so,
rather than repeating now-familiar arguments about decay versus
some other (often unspecified)1 form of interference as the source
of forgetting (see Ricker et al., 2014, for a review), here we will
specifically consider interference by overwriting as it appears
from the perspective of auditory perception and the organization
of the auditory environment.
The introduction of overwriting or displacement as a key
determinant of forgetting over the short-term can be traced
back to early studies of auditory sensory memory. Classically, a
restricted-capacity acoustic sensory memory trace, overwritten
by subsequent auditory events (Crowder and Morton, 1969), is
available to supplement end-of-sequence recall otherwise only
supported by “post-categorical” short-term memory systems
dedicated to verbal memory but otherwise blind to sensory
modality or the perceptual origins of the memoranda. This
venerable account is nonetheless still extant and has been
incorporated into more recent formulations of the contribution
of sensory memory to immediate recall of auditory-verbal
material (e.g., Page and Norris, 1998, and Burgess and Hitch,
1999, both make reference to an auditory input buffer overwritten
by subsequent data). Latterly, other formulations of short-
term memory have also utilized overwriting as a means of
implementing interference and hence forgetting. For example,
in providing a framework for short-term memory that eschews
decay as a concept, Nairne (1990, 2002), Neath and Nairne
(1995), Neath (2000), Oberauer and Kliegl (2006), Oberauer
and Lange (2008), Lewandowsky et al. (2009), and Oberauer
(2009) explicitly replace decay with overwriting as an explanatory
concept. For memory of specifically auditory origin, therefore,
three claims have been made:
(1) An auditory sensory store is overwritten, an item at a time,
during encoding (e.g., Crowder and Morton, 1969; Page
1In fact, Lewandowsky et al. (2009, box 4) postulate at least four possible
alternatives to trace decay and Ricker et al. (2014, Table 1) suggest five possibilities,
all of which – as with decay itself – may be implemented in different ways (e.g.,
Lewandowsky and Farrell, 2011).
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and Norris, 1998; Burgess and Hitch, 1999; Mercer and
McKeown, 2010a).
(2) Both modality specific (sensory) and modality-independent
(post-categorical, phonological) features are overwritten
during encoding (e.g., Neath and Nairne, 1995; Neath,
2000).
(3) Features are overwritten via neural competition removing
the availability of feature-units at a post-encoding phase
(Oberauer and Kliegl, 2006; Oberauer and Lange, 2008;
Oberauer, 2009).
It is interesting that the “precategorical” acoustic nature
of the auditory sensory store (Crowder and Morton, 1969)
arose because of prior theoretical commitments to a model
of word recognition—the logogen model—which assumed a
single system for recognizing both written and spoken words
(Morton, 1964, 1969). Subsequent to this, changes to the logogen
model (Morton, 1979) removed this theoretical constraint and
introduced separate auditory and visual input logogens so that
the idea that overwriting occurred at an early processing stage
was retained even though the original a priori reasons for
assuming that overwriting occurred prior to word-identification
had vanished. The Crowder and Morton (1969) view is, despite
its commitment to a pre-categorical (presumably continuous)
representational format a classically item-based data buffer
system of the first-in, first-out variety. Their approach can be
contrasted with the forms of overwriting implemented in models
by Nairne (1990) and Lange and Oberauer (2005).
In Nairne’s (1990) feature model of immediate memory,
individual items are represented as vectors of features, which
may represent modality-specific or modality-independent
information. The eponymous features were speculatively
identified with patterns of neural firing by Beaman et al. (2008)
and, although their exact nature and status has never been
formally defined, it is at this level that overwriting operates
within the model. Feature overwriting works by an incoming
item deleting identical features already held as part of the
representation of immediately preceding item. For example, if
the third feature of item n+1 of a sequence takes the same value
as item n of the same sequence then the item-level representation
of n is denuded of this feature, the representation becomes
degraded as a consequence and n is henceforth less likely to be
correctly recalled when cued to do so at some point in the future.
In contrast, the version of overwriting put forward by Lange
and Oberauer (2005) and Oberauer and Kliegl (2006) interference
is not limited to the preceding item. Like the approach of
Nairne (1990), the model is once again feature-based; in this
instance, however, different items are represented as patterns
of activation across a subset of the features (“feature units”)
available system-wide and representations compete for access to
their constituent feature units. Where a given representation loses
this competition, the feature unit is captured by that competitor
and is not available as part of the item representation of the
“losing” representation. In this way a particular representation
is degraded, thus impeding recall. The neural competition
for features is framed in terms of synchronized firing of
neurons as a mechanism of binding together the features that
belong to the representation of an item (Raffone and Wolters,
2001). Feature units possessing features belonging to the same
representation fire synchronously, whereas units belonging to
different representations fire out of synchrony.
The principal difficulty with overwriting as the sole, or key,
determinant of failure to recall in these or any other accounts
is that while many studies have reported greater interference
when irrelevant information (e.g., from a secondary task; Lange
and Oberauer, 2005) is related to the memoranda, or when
the list items are themselves similar along a specific dimension
(e.g., the phonological similarity effect; Conrad, 1964; Conrad
and Hull, 1964; Baddeley, 1966) other studies have shown the
opposite. Overwriting in the three accounts given above assumes
that interference occurs between similar items or items with
similar features – acoustic items displace earlier acoustic items in
a precategorical store (Crowder and Morton, 1969) or features
are overwritten if they are shared between successive items
(Nairne, 1990) or if they are supported by common feature units
(Lange and Oberauer, 2005). These assumptions readily account
for data in which interference is observed at recall between
items that are similar along one or more crucial dimensions.
However, Mercer and McKeown (2010a,b) found that complex
tones were more accurately identified in a same-different task
when followed by distractors containing novel frequencies –
those frequencies not present in the target - when compared
to a condition in which the distractors shared frequencies with
the target. This pattern of results is directly contrary to that
which would naturally occur if similarity-based overwriting was
in operation.
Interestingly, Mercer and McKeown (2010b) also concluded
in favor of an overwriting account – but in their model,
directly contrary to assumptions made by other theorists
about overwriting, “interference is principally caused by tones
that include novel features since these will be most potent
in “overwriting” the contents of the auditory spectral short-
term memory buffer” (Mercer and McKeown, 2010b, p. 1258,
emphasis added). In other words, this model assumes overwriting
by items which are representationally distinct from the preceding
input, rather than by items which share features with earlier
items. Whether overwriting is assumed to occur amongst similar
or dissimilar items/features is, of course, an a priori decision
for any theorist attempting to construct a model (Lewandowsky
and Farrell, 2011) but it is unlikely that similar items would
be overwritten in some cognitive systems and dissimilar items
overwritten elsewhere. To allow that closely related cognitive and
perceptual subsystems work on diametrically opposed principles
is, at best, un-parsimonious and contrary to Occam’s Razor.
If overwriting is to be accepted then a consistent set of rules
should apply (Surprenant and Neath, 2009). Nor is the study
by Mercer and McKeown (2010b) (which involved fairly “low-
level” and non-verbal acoustic stimuli) unique in its findings.
An earlier study by Nairne and Kelley (1999) showed that the
phonological similarity effect observed with verbal stimuli is
reversed after relatively brief periods of distraction, resulting
in better performance in a serial order reconstruction test for
phonologically similar lists than for phonologically dissimilar
lists. If overwriting is seen as necessary to account for forgetting
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caused by interference effects between similar items, then
reversing these similarity effects casts doubt upon the need for
overwriting.
Finally, task requirements—which are unlikely to directly
influence low-level processes such as overwriting/displacement
of patterns of neural firing or competition for neural feature
units—also play a substantial role in similarity effects for which
overwriting is offered as an explanatory mechanism. Despite
numerous documented similarities between immediate free and
serial recall (Beaman and Jones, 1998; Bhatarah et al., 2006, 2008;
Ward et al., 2010; Grenfell-Essam and Ward, 2012; Grenfell-
Essam et al., 2013; Spurgeon et al., 2014) similarity effects within
the to-be-recalled list —supposedly reflecting the impact of
item-representations degraded by direct over-writing (Nairne,
1990) or competition for specific feature units (Oberauer and
Kliegl, 2006)—depress performance on immediate serial recall
tasks but enhance performance in free recall (Fournet et al.,
2003). Once again it is difficult to reconcile such findings with
a low-level, item-based and automatic overwriting interference
process without appealing to a higher-level activity that negates,
and more than negates, the negative effect of similarity-based
overwriting. To account for the reversal of the phonological
similarity effect, Nairne and Kelley (1999) proposed that a period
of distraction allows phonological similarity to be used as a cue
to select candidate items for serial reconstruction of order (e.g.,
any correct item must share a rime with all other items) and
similar suggestions are equally applicable to free, or item, recall
situations (e.g., Watkins et al., 1974; Saint-Aubin and Poirier,
1999). However, such accounts are necessarily post hoc and—if
overwriting occurs—strategies such as these must be sufficiently
ubiquitous and powerful enough to not only negate but reverse
the similarity effects otherwise observed. Exigencies of space
mean that the interesting issue of retrieval mode and streaming
cannot here be addressed fully but we note that free recall is in
part controlled by strategic retrieval factors so that we may expect
effects such as those of similarity to be different dependent upon
the mode of recall and, critically, scoring technique employed.
A stream of similar-sounding items will necessarily lose order
cues relative to a dissimilar stream up until the point that items
become so dissimilar that stream coherence is lost (Jones et al.,
1999). There are no such necessary consequences for retrieval
of individual items so scoring criteria at test are crucial in the
appearance and form of similarity effects.
AUDITORY SCENE ANALYSIS: SOME
PRELIMINARIES
If a structural account of forgetting is set aside, what remains?
Perceptual organization has profound consequences not just for
the coherence of our experience of the world but also for the
accessibility of information contained within it. Perception itself
is directly linked to memory, as, for example, the perception
of loudness is determined by a temporal integration of acoustic
power; the perceived loudness of a burst of white noise depends
upon its duration (Scharf, 1978) demonstrating that perception
is reliant upon memory in a manner which renders the simple
idea that incoming stimuli “automatically” overwrite pre-existing
representations problematic. There is a mass of evidence showing
powerful effects of perceptual organization and, as with vision,
it is useful to think of auditory perception in terms of objects.
So, despite being intrinsically evanescent in a way that the
visual world is often not, successive events are assembled into
temporally extended objects in a way that allows several “streams”
of information to co-exist. Note that this is immediately different
from the situation assumed within most models of verbal STM,
which concentrate upon memory for a single list, and require
further work to allow simultaneous representation of multiple
lists or streams within the same representational space. Generally,
the rules of organization follow Gestalt principles that are based
on the physical attributes of the stimuli: proximity, similarity,
closure, symmetry, common fate, continuity, among others.
So, auditory perception is an active process that partitions
the auditory world into auditory objects or streams, a process
known generically as auditory scene analysis (Bregman, 1990).
It is difficult to overstate the importance that these forces of
organization have on what may be retrieved from an auditory
scene, even when the scene comprises a few simple stimuli.
Necessarily, stream formation involves memory. A succession
of individual stimuli achieves stream quality by a process
that depend on not just a single but many preceding stimuli,
a process that requires storage. Streams take time to form
and less compelling streams can vacillate and break down.
In everyday environments, scene analysis typically results in
several simultaneous streams, such as the instruments of a rock
bank or orchestra, or indeed a domestic scene of refrigerator
noise, radio and conversation. Also, the principles by which
this is achieved are embodied in musical polyphony: the rules
of composition—though in a non-acoustic language—allow a
composer to generate an intelligible and coherent rendition of
harmonic and melodic intent.
So, the logic adopted here is that auditory memory is
intimately connected to auditory perception and that in turn the
study of auditory perception suggests ways in which auditory-
verbal memory is organized. Furthermore, we know that this
organization is not veridical, in as much as it does not faithfully
represent an item-by-item sequence, free of item clusters. As we
will see later, the item-clusters produced by auditory perception
are very much richer and more diverse than those considered by
current models of verbal STM.
It is useful to consider specific instances, using some very
simple non-verbal stimuli, of how perceptual organization of
sound brings about changes to perception before returning to the
case of verbal memory. The first example shows how the context
in which stimuli appear works to shape what we may know of
them. Take the very simple case of two short tones, A and B,
the same in every respect except that they are a semi-tone apart,
presented in quick succession (see Figure 1). When faced with
the task of reporting the order as being high-low or low-high,
most listeners find they can make the discrimination quite easily.
However, if flankers (F1 and F2)—sharing almost the same pitch
and tempo as A and B (see again Figure 1)— are inserted either
side of them then we observe a dramatic reduction in the capacity
to report the order of A and B. How might this come about?
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FIGURE 1 | Arrangement of stimuli in the experiment of Bregman and
Rudnicky (1975). (A) Shows two stimuli—A and B—differing slightly in pitch.
(B) Shows the case where two stimuli (flankers) of identical pitch—F1 and
F2—flank the AB pair. (C) Shows the case in which a sequence of
stimuli—the captor C stimuli—precede and follow the flanker stimuli. The
flankers and captors share pitch and timing.
One way to think in terms of overwriting and to suppose that the
second flanker (or indeed both flankers) somehow interfere with
the representation of A and B, making their comparison less easy.
Another way is frame the change in context in terms of object
formation. Whilst presented as a pair, A and B formed a single
object and at the same time constituted its boundaries. Adding
the flankers created a new object and new boundaries, with A and
B now constituting its innards, so that now the order information
contained in A and B becomes more difficult to address. This
is a familiar situation in STM where current recall of the items
and order of the first and last few items gives rise to primacy and
recency effects, with recall of items in the correct order very much
worse toward the center of the list.
A simple further addition to this auditory scene shows how
implausible the overwriting explanation turns out to be in the
case of simple tones. If we add a further two stimuli (C1 and
C2 in Figure 1) either side and sharing both pitch and tempo
with the flankers then we witness a remarkable transformation:
if we now ask a listener to judge the pitch order of A and B,
close to full efficiency (that is, the level of performance when A
and B are presented in isolation) is restored. Clearly, according to
the overwriting view (and indeed, most interference theories of
forgetting) adding more stimuli should – if anything – produce
more overwriting, not less. However, the outcome of adding the C
stimuli is readily understood in terms of auditory scene analysis.
The C stimuli act as ‘captors,’ that is, by virtue of their greater
similarity to the F stimuli than to the AB pair, two objects are
formed; the one: CCCF1F2CCC, the other: AB. The flankers are
captured, releasing AB to become a separate, and therefore an
independently addressable, entity thereby restoring memory for
the order of A and B.
This setting shows several remarkable qualities of auditory
scene analysis with a number of important implications for the
way we understand memory. The first and most profound is
that the future shapes the past: perception is retroactive. What
follows from this has great relevance to our current discussion
about the plausibility of overwriting as an explanatory construct.
Critically, the perceptibility of AB is only decided when both F2
and CCC are presented, but even then both F2CCC and AB are
distinguishable only with reference to F1 and CCC. The first point
that follows from this is that it is important therefore to think
in terms of the emergent properties of the stimulus ensemble
(the object), not merely as an aggregation of the properties of
individual stimuli. The second point is that items need not be
temporally adjacent in order to form into objects.
A second illustration lends weight to the first while at the same
time addressing the natural skepticism that such a simple setting
involving the mere ‘perception’ of tones A and B could have more
general repercussions for more complex settings that we think
as being characteristic of the study of ‘memory.’ Here again, the
listener is asked to compare two tones but this time asked to make
the judgment about whether they are the same or different in
pitch (Jones et al., 1997).
Figure 2 shows the arrangement of stimuli used by Jones,
Macken, and Harries (following, for example, Deutsch, 1972,
1978a,b; Semal and Demany, 1991, 1993; Starr and Pitt, 1997;
Mathias and von Kriegstein, 2014). First, a standard stimulus—
a tone—is followed either by a blank interval or a filled interval
and then, some seconds later, by a comparison stimulus: another
tone. The listener is asked to ignore stimuli that come between
the standard and comparison tones in making their judgment.
The key variable of interest is the content of the interval
and its effects on the accuracy of the comparison judgment.
Having a sequence of tones in the interval similar in pitch and
timbre to the standard and comparison (see Figure 2) has a
dramatic effect of reducing the accuracy of the same-different
judgment. If, instead of having tones, we have speech stimuli
(say a sequence of words), comparison judgment improves
considerably, to a level that is close to when there are no
interpolated stimuli. This result is conventionally interpreted
in an overwriting framework: memory for the standard is
compromised by similar stimuli interpolated between it and
the comparison (e.g., Semal and Demany, 1991, 1993; Mathias
and von Kriegstein, 2014). However, another of the conditions
in the study of Jones et al. (1997) makes this interpretation
implausible. If the number of interpolated tones is doubled then
any reasonable interpretation the overwriting account suggests
that performance cannot improve and should, in fact, deteriorate.
If overwriting interferes only with the immediately preceding
item (as with Nairne, 1990) then the level of interference remains
the same, although the increase in the number of sources
competing for consideration at recall could still negatively
affect overall performance. If overwriting is not restricted to
immediately preceding items (as with Lange and Oberauer, 2005)
then performance should deteriorate, and appreciably so given
the rise in number of interfering sources. In the event, the
opposite turns out to be true; performance improves significantly.
If we construe the setting in terms of auditory scene analysis,
this last result is entirely intelligible. In object terms, the
proximity of the standard to the interpolated tones and the
similarity of their physical character (sharing tone-like qualities),
along with its shared timing, increases the likelihood that it will
be incorporated with them into an object, thereby reducing its
identity as a separate entity. When the interpolated material is
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FIGURE 2 | The stimuli used by Jones et al. (1997). Both parts of the figure show an arrangement of tones both each with an initial standard tone (S) and final
test tone (T), but with different interpolated sequences. Participants are asked to make a ‘same’ or ‘different’ judgment in terms of the pitch of the tones.
Performance in terms of percent correct responses is shown on the right. (A) Shows two cases: one with interpolated tones and the other with interpolated spoken
digits. (B) Shows the case of the standard rate of presentation and below the case where the number of stimuli is doubled.
speech, of course this tendency will be much less likely. Doubling
the number of interpolated tone stimuli is likely to produce an
outcome similar to that seen with interpolated speech stimuli: by
virtue of shared timing (in addition to shared pitch and timbre)
the interpolated stimuli will in this case form an object separate
from the standard. The judgment of similarity is once again
based on two stimuli distinct from the interpolated stimuli: the
scene comprises three objects, a standard, a distinct interpolated
stream, and the comparison.
Streaming thus produces important consequences for our
judgment of the plausibility of overwriting as an explanatory
mechanism and for hearing and memory. The context in which
stimuli appear has powerful repercussions for what we can
retrieve of stimuli. As we shall go on to consider, the fact that
auditory stimuli appear in chronological order does not mean
that that access to temporally adjacent stimuli is guaranteed. So,
for instance, if we present a sequence in alternating male-female
voices (M1F2M3F4M5F6), two streams are formed (M1M3M5 and
F2F4F6) a situation that contrasts with a single (e.g., male) stream:
M1M2M3M4M5M6. By forming two distinct streams it will
become more difficult to retrieve chronologically adjacent stimuli
(e.g., M1F2M3F4 will be harder to retrieve than M1M2M3M4),
but easier to retrieve stream-adjacent (and chronologically non-
adjacent) stimuli (e.g., M1M3M5 will be easier to retrieve in the
alternating voices case) if cued to retrieve the utterances in strict
temporal order of their occurrence. Notice that—as suggested
earlier—the stream can contain non-adjacent elements. This
contrasts with the typical interpretations of ‘chunking’ (and also
“grouping”) that invariably refer to an aggregation of temporally
adjacent elements. Auditory scene analysis shows that even quite
remote elements may be assembled into an organized whole.
This is why scene analysis and chunking are slightly different
mechanisms and why it is important to consider remote elements
in any scene analysis (see Jones, 1993, 1999; Jones et al., 1996; for
extended discussions). This relates to the question of overwriting
because temporally remote and non-adjacent items can have a
greater effect upon memory for any given target item than does
the immediately subsequent item, a result which is inconsistent
with at least two forms of overwriting (Crowder and Morton,
1969; Nairne, 1990)
Perhaps the simplest and most telling prediction from the
overwriting hypothesis is that sequences with fewer shared
features should be easier to retrieve than those with many
shared features. This follows from such ideas as the relative
distinctiveness principle, the suggestion that an item (or series
of items) perceived to be discriminable on some dimension(s)
from its fellows is easier to recall by virtue of psychological
distinctiveness (a principle which is consistent with overwriting
as an underlying mechanism, although other mechanisms may
produce such an outcome; Surprenant and Neath, 2009; Neath,
2010). Evidence already reviewed indicates that this is not always
the case, and further data indicate that streaming may be a
useful concept in explaining outcomes that run contrary to this
principle.
Very distinct non-speech sounds, when presented quickly in
a sequence are easy to recognize, so that listeners can judge they
are present but are less able to indicate the order in which they
appeared. So, if a sequence of very different sounds—a high-
pitched tone, a hiss, a low-pitched tone and a buzz—are heard in
a repeating cycle, listeners are able to name each of the sounds.
However, they cannot report their order correctly, even if the
period of listening is extended indefinitely (Warren et al., 1969;
see also Jones et al., 1999). However, if a sequence of four spoken
digits—spoken in the same voice—is presented under the same
conditions, the order can be readily reported. The key difference
between these two settings is in the level of commonality in
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acoustic content: acoustically the digits form a variation on a
common ground and so quickly form a stream, but for the
non-voice sounds each element constitutes a separate entity and
streaming is less easy to achieve.2 Consider how such a situation
would be addressed by Nairne’s (1990) feature model, in which
automatic overwriting forms a large part. The identity of the
stimuli themselves would be represented in secondary memory,
so the task would simply be to match the correct primary memory
representation to the correct secondary memory identity in the
correct order. The task would be made difficult by the fact that
overwriting would degrade the primary memory representations
such that the primary-secondary memory match would become
more problematic and, potentially, confused. This confusion
would clearly be more prevalent in the situation under which
the most overwriting occurred – when the stimuli come from
a common source (spoken digits) and share common acoustic
and lexical features. These results pose grave difficulties for an
overwriting account; distinct sequences should be subject to
less overwriting, but the results are diametrically opposite. The
explanation comes from stream formation: when the stimuli are
perceived as originating from a common source they form a
single stream within which order is preserved.
AUDITORY SCENE ANALYSIS: THE
‘SUPRASEGMENTAL’ APPROACH
APPLIED TO VERBAL MEMORY
In view of the problems outlined earlier, we wish to outline an
alternative framework in which retrieval (in both sensory and
short-term memory) is constrained by perceptual principles. The
primary line of argument we wish to pursue is that the need to
maintain a coherent stream of information over time constrains
the processes operating within memory and hence automatic and
immediate overwriting of an item representation or the features
representing an item is not a tenable explanation for forgetting.
The auditory scene analysis principles outlined above, however,
were introduced with reference to simple auditory stimuli (e.g.,
tones) and in what follows these are expanded to encompass more
traditional verbal memory phenomena.
Within auditory memory, overwriting was originally proposed
as an explanation for the interference associated with a post-
stimulus suffix (Crowder and Morton, 1969) so we turn first to
this phenomenon and possible alternative accounts.
The Failure of Overwriting: Capturing the
Suffix
Classically, the existence of acoustic storage termed the
“precategorical acoustic store” (PAS; Crowder and Morton, 1969)
was assumed to precede “post-categorical” verbal storage (where
modality of origin – spoken or written – is irrelevant, a common
abstract representation is shared by all stimuli, regardless of input
modality). Its existence was inferred from the auditory recency
2The rate of presentation in these studies is fast and this prevents verbal labeling;
when the speed of presentation is slowed performance improves but only to a
relatively small degree.
effect, in which the final item of an auditorily presented list for
serial recall is recalled at near-ceiling levels compared to the
much smaller recency effect obtained with visually presented
lists of the same verbal items. The reason that this has been
attributed to a restricted capacity acoustic store is that elsewhere
along the list performance on visually and auditorily presented
lists is broadly equivalent (but see Beaman, 2002; Macken et al.,
2015) and is affected in a similar manner by standard verbal
manipulations such as phonological similarity, word-length, and
concurrent articulation. The final piece of evidence provided in
support of PAS was that the presence of a post-stimulus suffix
effectively eliminates this final-item advantage, leading Crowder
and Morton (1969) to conclude that the stimulus suffix effect
“depends upon selective displacement of information from PAS”
(Crowder and Morton, 1969, p. 369).
Crowder and Morton (1969) assumed an item-by-item
displacement system rather than feature-based overwriting
and one reason for disputing the feature-based interference
account of the stimulus suffix effect comes from data showing
that stimulus suffixes which are phonemically similar to the
memoranda do not necessarily show larger suffix effects
(Crowder and Cheng, 1973) and—like the other similarity-based
interference effects already reviewed—may also show smaller
effects (Carr and Miles, 1997). Another reason for questioning
feature-based overwriting comes from studies of streaming the
suffix. It is well established that the stimulus suffix effect depends
at least in part upon the suffix being perceived as originating
from the same sources, or stream, as the to-be-recalled list. So,
for example, variations in the spatial location, timbre and pitch
of the suffix relative to the list reduces the size of the suffix
effect whereas similar manipulations varying suffix frequency,
emotionality and meaning have no such effect (Morton et al.,
1971). Other manipulations varying the “speech-like” qualities of
the suffix similarly moderate the size of the suffix effect (Morton
et al., 1981). Manipulations of the top-down interpretation of the
suffix likewise show that forcing the suffix to be grouped with, or
apart from, the list affects the auditory memory interference effect
(Crowder, 1971; Frankish and Turner, 1984; Neath et al., 1993).
So, for example, ambiguous stimuli, which can be perceived as
either speech or non-speech, can be treated as a speech suffix
on the basis of labeling them as such (Ayres et al., 1979; Neath
et al., 1993). However, other non-speech stimuli do not show
a suffix effect unless contextual effects also force them to be
perceived as speech (Morton and Chambers, 1976; Ottley et al.,
1982). These results show that physically identical stimuli, which
bear physically identical relationships to the memoranda, can
produce different memory effects depending upon context and
expectation. At best, therefore, any interference effect obtained
under such circumstances can only be ascribed only in part to the
physical overwriting of the memory trace.
Perhaps most intriguingly, the effects of a repeated suffix have
also been shown to reduce the disruption observed (Crowder,
1971, 1978; Morton, 1976). With a repeated suffix, the same
suffix item is presented multiple times in quick succession and
in tempo with the list sequence (as usually also happens with
a single suffix). The reduced effect of the suffix when repeated
in this way, even though the first presentation of the repeated
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suffix is physically identical to the presentation of a single
suffix, is difficult to reconcile with an overwriting account based
upon physical or feature similarity between successive items
since the relationship between the suffix and the list items is
equivalent in the two conditions. Critically, a repeated suffix only
becomes a repeated suffix at the point of its re-presentation;
logically, therefore, automatic overwriting occasioned by the
first presentation of the suffix must already have occurred at
this point. Data such as these have led to suggestions that the
suffix effect might reflect the simultaneous action of overwriting,
accounting for the reduced suffix effect still observed, and
perceptual grouping, accounting for the difference between single
and repeated suffix effects (e.g., Morton, 1976). According to
these accounts, the repeated suffix forms a perceptual group
apart from the to-be-remembered list whereas the single suffix is
perceived as part of this list. It follows from this that the sole cause
of the disruption observed in the repeated suffix condition is from
overwriting. A single item suffix likewise overwrites the final item
but also further depresses memory performance by increasing the
functional size of the memory set (the list length) by an extra item
(e.g., Nairne, 1990).
These data undermine the importance of overwriting as
the source of the suffix memory disruption effect but do not
rule out the possibility that overwriting occurs; perhaps it
is merely contributing only part of the observed disruption.
Later data reported by Nicholls and Jones (2002) are, however,
less equivocal. In their experiments, Nicholls and Jones (2002)
interleaved a sequence of irrelevant items between the to-be-
remembered list items such that the suffix, when presented, was
perceptually grouped with, or “captured” by, these irrelevant
items. The sequence comprised the item ‘ah,’ which was also
used as the suffix in a traditional suffix effect condition (see
Figure 3). When no-suffix, suffix and captured suffix conditions
are compared, it is clear that in the captured suffix condition
performance approximates that to the no-suffix condition3. In the
captured suffix condition the recency effect was fully restored and
there was no suffix effect on the final list-item when the suffix was
grouped, or streamed, with the sequence of irrelevant items. In
contrast, the suffix presented alone continued to produce a suffix
effect. Unlike the repeated suffix manipulation which reduced
but did not eliminate the suffix effect, these data cannot easily
be explained by the joint operation of overwriting and grouping
since—in this case—the grouping (or streaming) manipulation
removed the suffix effect entirely and hence the need to assume
overwriting as the basis of the suffix effect.
Thus, the proposition that auditory-sensory memory is
necessarily automatically overwritten is untenable. However,
the suffix effect is only a single line of evidence. Recently,
doubts about overwriting have been reinforced by findings from
a paradigm using alternating voices for each list item and
observing the consequences for memory of streams created in
this way (Hughes et al., 2009). A suffix presented in a different
voice reduces the suffix effect (Morton et al., 1971), consistent
with the idea that overwriting depends on similarity between
3Notably, the mere presence of an irrelevant sequence of repeated items has no
appreciable effect on serial recall.
the suffix and the final list item but also consistent with the
idea that a different voice suffix is grouped apart from the
list items. If overwriting is automatic and based solely upon
such physical properties and relationships between successive
items, then presenting the to-be-recalled list in alternating voices
(e.g., male-female-male and so on), should limit the overwriting
observed between successive items compared to the same items
presented in a single voice because the feature similarity is
reduced by the voice change. Hence, overall recall should be
enhanced relative to single-voice presentation. Alternatively, if
perceptual organization is important so that items presented in
different voices are streamed as coming from distinct sources,
then recalling the items in the correct serial order should be
harder. As noted in early research on auditory attention, items
are preferentially recalled according to the stream or channel
from which they are perceived to originate (e.g., Broadbent, 1958;
for an extensive discussion see Hughes et al., in press) such that
if the two voices are perceived as two separate streams then to
recall the items in correct serial order requires participants to
shift alternately between streams in order to reconstruct the serial
order of the list. This extra cognitive requirement imposes a
behavioral cost such that a list of alternating voices is not recalled
as well as the same items presented in a single voice (Hughes et al.,
2009; see Figure 4). Again this talker-variability effect calls into
question the predominance of overwriting, which would predict
the opposite pattern of results.
Time, Space and Voice-Based Grouping
Effects
The talker-variability effect, together with the different-voice
suffix effect, supports the assumption that lists presented
in different voices are perceptually grouped apart and that
this influences the appearance of memory phenomena. Such
assumptions find further support from early work on auditory
attention (Broadbent, 1958) together with current theories of
low-level auditory perception, within which auditory stream
segregation (Bregman, 1990) plays a central role. One further
line of evidence, however, serves to emphasize the relationship
between perceptual organization and what seem superficially
to be wholly mnemonic processes (suffix and talker-variability
effects).
Work on grouping within auditory memory by Frankish and
Turner (1984), Frankish (1985, 1989, 1995) directly examines
the effect of perceptual grouping on subsequent recall. In a
series of experiments, Frankish (1985, 1989, 1995) demonstrated
that coherent groups can be formed within lists presented
for immediate serial recall. These groups are defined by
boundaries that exhibit the same, or similar, primacy and
recency effects at recall as the longer lists of which they
form a part. For example in a control (ungrouped) list,
recency occurs only at the end of the list. However, in a
9-item list which is organized into three groups of three
items each—for example by a delay in presentation between
items 3 and 4 and between items 6 and 7—recency is seen
for the final item of group 1 (at serial position 3, which
must therefore be relatively immune to the suffix effects of
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FIGURE 3 | (A) Shows schematically the arrangement of stimuli used by Nicholls and Jones (2002). The control condition comprises a sequence of eight
to-be-remembered digits. The suffix-only condition has a spoken irrelevant item ‘zero’ at the end of the to-be-remembered sequence. The Irrelevant + Suffix
condition shows a sequence of irrelevant stimuli (‘zero’) beginning well before the irrelevant sequence and culminating with an item after the last digit in the
to-be-remembered sequence. The ‘Irrelevant (No Suffix)’ condition is the same as the Irrelevant + Suffix condition without a terminal suffix. (B) Shows the
performance associated with each of those conditions as a function of the presentation position of the stimuli within the to-be-remembered sequence.
item 4). Grouping is effective when it employs exactly those
principles of perceptual organization important for reducing
the suffix effect. These principles include change of voice,
delay in presentation, and change of spatial location, all of
which have been confirmed as producing within-list recency
effects associated with groups (Frankish, 1989). The principles
of grouping in auditory-verbal memory, it appears, are readily
inferred from the data showing a reduction of the suffix
effect. Additionally, Frankish (1985) showed that, with visual
presentation, there is little extra grouping advantage by inserting
extra pauses after the third and sixth items in the nine-item
list. Frankish (1985) found no obvious difference between the
serial position curves produced when participants are asked to
subjectively group visual lists and those produced when the
presentation of the lists was grouped by half second pauses
(Experiment 1).
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FIGURE 4 | (A) Shows a sub-set of stimuli used by Hughes et al. (2009). To-be-remembered stimuli are first shown in isolation with lists either all from the same
voice (Single) and then shown with alternating male and female voices (Alternating). Participants are required to report all the list in the sequence in which it was
presented. Then lists with lead-in are shown. In the first case both the lead-in and the to-be-remembered list are in the same voice (Single–Single) and then in
alternating voices (Alternating-Alternating). (B) Shows the performance associated with each of those conditions as a function of the presentation position of the
stimuli within the to-be-remembered sequence.
In a further study, Frankish (1989) showed that an extra
pause of only 80 ms following the third and sixth items had as
much effect as an extra half-second pause. Likewise, when the
middle three digits were differentiated from the others by either
voice (male vs. female) or spatial channel (left vs. right ear), the
effects of these manipulations were equivalent to those of the
temporal change. In addition, the study demonstrated that the
voice distinction alone is as effective as voice plus pause. That is,
if the middle three digits are in a different voice from the first
and last three, then inserting a pause of half a second after the
third and sixth digits, thereby, in addition, temporarily isolating
the middle three digits, has no further effect.
These effects appear to reflect the automatic segmentation
of auditory lists in a manner that is more powerful than the
strategic grouping that operates on visually presented lists which
produces less of an effect and is more readily disrupted (Hitch
et al., 1996). Although a number of researchers (e.g., Hitch
et al., 1996; Farrell, 2012) have concentrated on the role of
timing—and of extended pauses—in creating groups, Frankish’s
results clearly show that perceptual groups can be created
using cues other than elongated pauses between list items. This
observation is important because it shows that factors other
than consolidation and rehearsal of a recently completed group
(in the pause before the next group arrives) are responsible
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for creating these group boundaries. It also shows that the
group boundaries can be established very quickly – parsing
the list into subgroups almost instantaneously as the stimuli
are encountered. Thus, although providing temporal cues to
grouping and allowing (or encouraging; Taylor et al., 2015)
prosodic, group-based rehearsal to emerge is one means of
parsing the input, it is not the only way in which within-
list organization can emerge. Crucially for current purposes,
the perceptual segmentation of auditory lists is one that
requires the constant comparison of the current and preceding
auditory input. Automatic overwriting of previous stimuli by
incoming information would interfere with the allocation of
the current (incoming) stimulus to the appropriate perceptual
stream, which may have been established over several preceding
items.
Principles of Organization:
Similarity-Based Streaming
Generally, theories of short-term memory memory fail to
acknowledge (or at most, pay lip-service to) the idea that
events might be organized—and re-organized—according to
perceptual streams. Rather, current theories view short-term
memory as post-categorical, item-based encoding within a
single, to-be-recalled list. The item here is defined by the
experimenter a priori rather than inferred from the behavior
of the participant. Those characteristics of the stimuli that
denote common origin, that connote streams—among them
similarity of pitch, timbre, location, and proximity in time—
are ignored by such accounts, which also overlook the fluidity
and flexibility of systems within which items are organized—
and re-organized—according to their perceived belonging to one
or more sources of origin. We argue that this is a profound
mistake.
In the first instance, it is logical to assume that whatever
form representations take in memory is constrained by the way
in which information is available perceptually. The existence
of natural organizational principles, known since the advent of
Gestalt psychology, implies that multiple streams of information
co-exist within memory in a way that is inconsistent with strict
overwriting as the mechanism for forgetting. In the second
instance, treating memoranda as discrete and independent
items within the experimental participants’ cognitive systems
because they were conceived and presented as such by the
experimenter is an unwarranted assumption. The assumption
arises directly from the idea that representations are, almost
by definition, abstract and “post-categorical,” whereas in fact
very few studies have examined the extent to which memory
results can be accounted for by categorical vs. continuous
storage systems (Frankish, 2008; Joseph et al., 2015). Taken
to the extreme, it is clear that the recall of individual
items is not independent, and whilst few models make this
mistake, the amount and type of information relating the
experimenter-defined items to one another and to a perceived
locus of origin is impoverished in current theories. The
relationship between items is formally often one merely of
time or position (e.g., Page and Norris, 1998; Brown et al.,
2007). Commonality of perceptual characteristics rarely plays
a role because all of the elements within the memoranda
are automatically assigned to a single list-structure, something
that presumably occurs at a pre-mnemonic processing stage.
Where between-item similarity is considered (as for example,
to model the phonological similarity effect) this may often
be at a distinct stage from positional similarity. For example,
the primacy model of Page and Norris (1998) in which
positional errors between localist representations occur naturally
along the “primacy gradient” then forward items onto an
explicitly phonological distributed representation stage prior to
output in order to implement item confusion errors (Beaman,
2000)4.
Missing from all of these accounts is any measure of stream-
based similarity such that elements within the memoranda are
allocated to one stream or another based upon a common
theme or thread running through the sequence and which
serves to distinguish this stream from another. Stream-based
similarity, according to this analysis, is necessary to account
for the effects reviewed above – the reduction or elimination
of suffix effects, the talker variability effect, the perceptual
grouping effect and so on. The thread of similarity that
acts to hold elements together is, however, precisely the
source of interference that would consistently and continually
degrade individual item representations under an overwriting
account.
The availability of information about the stream to which
the stimuli belong is precisely what is needed to account
for moderation and abolition of suffix effects, between-talker
variability effects, and within-list grouping effects as reviewed
here. Discontinuities in time (i.e., elongated breaks between
groups) have been used to account for within-list temporal
grouping effects (Nairne, 1990; Hitch et al., 1996; Farrell,
2012). This mechanism follows naturally from the idea of
overwriting, since a break is naturally interpreted as a pause
in which information can be consolidated and/or within which
retroactive interference (such as overwriting) will not occur.
Such accounts do not properly address the effects of very
short pauses between groups which are more parsimoniously
conceived of as groupings caused by discontinuities in rhythm
rather than time per se, nor are they able to account
for grouping effects caused by intonation, timbre or spatial
location. For the same reasons, speaker-variability effects and
reduced suffix effects are not predicted by such accounts
because the models do not maintain the correct types of
information to give rise to such effects. To do so, not only
must information about physical characteristics be maintained
in addition to whatever post-categorical or more abstract
labels that may be assumed, but also information must be
held about the stream as a whole rather than individual
items in isolation, and incoming information (e.g., a post-
list suffix) interpreted in terms of the information held and
4This is a mirror image of how the feature model addresses the same situation:
in the feature model, item-based confusions arise naturally from the distributed
representation of items as vectors of feature values but positional errors only occur
when an item independently “drifts” along the position dimension (Neath, 1999,
2000).
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prior expectations it elicits, as shown both by contextual suffix
effects and by experiments repeating and streaming the suffix.
The main conclusions point to the intimacy of perception
and memory, or perhaps even to their wholesale integration.
Certainly, no attribution to the action of auditory memory
should be entertained until a thoroughgoin analysis of how
auditory streaming could explain the same phenomena has been
dismissed. Only after streaming processes have yielded the super-
ordinate structure of the material being remembered can other
approaches – such as overwriting – be entertained as explanatory
constructs.
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